Evidence
The kinds of evidence we hold
Not one number, but five different kinds of proof. We check the machinery before trusting it, generate coverage far beyond what a person would write, rerun everything to expose instability, refuse fixes that break what worked, and have the accounting audited by someone who did not produce it. Each block below is a separate measurement with its own source.
Pipeline validationThe simulated customer was checked before it was used
An agent is tested by talking to a simulated customer. If the simulator invents facts or breaks the conversation rules, the whole result is worthless. So we tested the simulator itself against declared telecom interaction scenarios first.
- 22 of 24
- simulated interactions met every required check
Each interaction was scored against the checks declared for it. 22 passed all of them.
out of 24 simulated interactions
- 97.1%
- of declared behaviour checks passed
Across all 24 interactions, the mean share of individual declared checks that passed.
out of all declared checks across 24 interactions
- 100%
- of safety checks passed
The subset of checks covering what the simulated customer must never do.
out of the safety axis of the same suite
- 0
- execution errors
No interaction failed for infrastructure reasons.
out of 24 simulated interactions
This is evidence for this telecom test environment and the configuration we selected. It is not a claim about customer simulation in general. The model used is not published.
Source: project_knowledge/candidate_agents_sweep/results/runtime_user_enactment_grid_v3_unicode_regrade_v1/summary.json · cells[] where clearance is true
Pipeline validationReading the policy correctly was tested before it was relied on
Turning a written policy into checkable requirements is the step everything else rests on. A reader that accepts a requirement the policy never stated would quietly invent the standard the agent is judged against.
- 0
- false acceptances, in each of five repeats
A false acceptance is marking a requirement satisfied when the labelled ground truth says it was not. The approved configuration recorded none, in every repeat.
out of 5 repeats over the labelled development set
- 170
- labelled requirements in the development set
The positive requirements the interpreter was scored against.
out of the locked telecom development set
- 5
- repeats, independently audited
The full gate passed and an independent audit recorded APPROVE.
out of 5 repeats
On the locked telecom development set, the policy interpreter was tested against labelled requirements before it was used downstream. This is a development measurement, not a claim of universal policy understanding, and not a certification.
Source: project_knowledge/candidate_agents_sweep/results/final_sweep_report_v1/summary.json · role_findings.semantic_judge_composite
Coverage and repeatabilityFrom one declared policy to 596 test situations
A policy of a few pages becomes a suite far larger than anyone would write by hand. Breadth is the point: the situations a person would not think to try are the ones that find problems.
- 596
- generated telecom test situations
Produced from the declared policy and tool schemas, per run of the suite.
out of one run of the generated suite
- 1,192
- total attempts across two runs of the suite
The full suite executed twice.
out of 2 runs of 596 situations
- 0
- execution errors, and none hit the turn limit
Every attempt completed.
out of 1,192 attempts
332situations came out differently on the second run
That is not a success rate and it is not a failure rate. It is the finding: more than half the suite was unstable between runs. A single run would have reported one of those outcomes and hidden the other, which is why we repeat runs and lock confirmed failures as regression tests rather than trusting one pass.
Part of this movement comes from the simulated customer, which runs with variation rather than a fixed seed. The disagreement is therefore not purely the agent's instability.
These were two independent runs of the same generated suite, not one native two-repeat command. All grading here is structural; no model judged it.
Source: project_knowledge/candidate_agents_sweep/results/parallel_telecom_generated_exhaustive_v1/manifest_accounting_failure_analysis.json · denominator, repeat_reconciliation.cases_with_solved_or_score_disagreement
Promotion gateA fix is not promoted just because the score went up
The same safety fix was tried on two pinned deployments. On the first it cleared. On the second it raised the aggregate score and fixed both safety cases — and was still refused, because it broke two things that had worked.
- 16 → 18 of 18
- on the deployment where the fix cleared
Every task passed after the change, with no task that previously passed now failing.
out of 18 tasks
- 0 → 2 of 2
- safety cases fixed on that deployment
The two cases the fix was designed for went from failing to passing.
out of 2 safety cases
- 13 → 16 of 18
- on the second deployment, and still refused
Aggregate performance rose and both safety cases passed, but two previously passing tasks began failing.
out of 18 tasks
- 2
- new failures that blocked promotion
The same task failed in both repeats after the change. The zero-regression requirement was not met, so the fix was not cleared for that deployment.
out of tasks that passed before the change
These are two pinned deployments of one agent framework, on an 18-task fixture. It shows how promotion is gated, not that any fix generalises. The refused transfer is recorded as refused; it is not reported as a partial success.
Source: project_knowledge/candidate_agents_sweep/results/deep_optimization_openhands_special_file_transfer_v1/summary.json · clearance, comparison; and final_sweep_report_v1/summary.json deep_optimization
Accounting and independent auditThe record was reconciled, and independently audited
Evidence is only worth what its accounting is worth. The sweep's own numbers were checked by someone who did not produce them.
- 35
- public agent systems and benchmarks with repeated evidence
Each ran more than once. They use different denominators and are never pooled into one score.
out of the full sweep
- 234
- attempts on one shared nine-task fixture
13 systems ran the same nine tasks twice, which is the only directly comparable panel in the sweep.
out of 13 systems × 9 tasks × 2 repeats
- 203 / 31
- passes and failures on that fixture
Every row is accounted for.
out of 234 attempts
- 0
- rows silently dropped
No attempt disappeared from the accounting between execution and reporting.
out of 234 attempts
- 16 of 16
- independent audit checks passed, with no findings
An independent review of the final report recorded APPROVE with no findings and no required corrections.
out of 16 audit checks
The audit covers the research report's internal accounting and reconciliation. It is not a certification of any product, model or benchmark.
Source: project_knowledge/candidate_agents_sweep/results/final_sweep_report_v1_audit/review.json · checks[], decision, findings; and final_sweep_report_v1/summary.json coverage, comparable_common_fixture